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love, Justice Marshall asserted a less strin-
gent test for race-based legislation: (1) that 
remedial goals must serve important gov-
ernmental objectives; (2) and must be 
substantially related to the attainment of 
those goals. Id. at 4150. Justice Marshall 
discerned two of Richmond's remedial 
goals: to eradicate the effects of past racial 
discrimination, and to refrain from perpet-
uating the effects of that discrimination. 
Id. at 4150-51. This discrimination was 
based on a "varied body of evidence." Id. 
at 4152. A national pattern of discrimina-
tion had been set, from which Richmond 
did not deviate. Set in this context, Justice 
Marshall argued "Richmond's reliance on 
localized, industry-specific findings is a far 
cry from the reliance on generalized 
'societal discrimination' which the majori-
ty decries as a basis for remedial action." 
Id. He accused the majority of disinge-
nuinely "disaggregating Richmond's local 
evidence, attacking it piecemeal, and there-
by conclude that no single piece of evi-
dence ... standing alone ... suffices to prove 
past discrimination." Id. at 4153. Justice 
Marshall concluded that the fourteenth 
amendment did not impose "such onerous 
[evidentiary] obligations upon states ... 
once the reality of past discrimination is 
apparent." Id. at 4154. 
Secondly, the Plan was valid because "it 
is substantially related to the interests it 
seeks to serve in remedying past discrimi-
nation .... " Id. at 4145. He pointed out 
that the majority overlooked the fact that 
Richmond had a previous antidiscrimina-
tion statute and race-neutral legislation 
that had virtually no effect on the eradica-
tion of the past discrimination. As to the 
majority's claim that the 30% target could 
not be narrowly tailored to any state goal, 
he proclaimed that the Court ignored the 
fact that the 30% figure was patterned 
directly on the Fullilove precedent. 
Justice Marshall concluded by denounc-
ing the majority's adoption of the strict 
scrutiny standard for review of race-
conscious remedial measures. He argued 
that remedial classifications warranted a 
different standard of review from "brute 
and repugnant state-sponsored racism" 
and that the Court's holding indicated 
"that it regards racism as a phenomenon of 
the past." Id. at 4155. 
The Court has adopted the rigid stand-
ard of strict scrutiny as the standard of 
review for benign and remedial discrimina-
tion measures. The Court's holding 
expressed that laws favoring blacks over 
whites must be judged by the same consti-
tutional standard as laws favoring whites 
over blacks. The result could be the undo-
ing of many affirmative action programs 
nationwide, and will serve to discourage 
the enactment of future affirmative action 
legislation. 
- Peter T. McDowell 
McAvoy v. State: A SUSPECT 
STOPPED FOR DRIVING WHILE 
INTOXICATED IS NOT ENTIUED 
TO MIRANDA ADVICE PRIOR TO 
A FIELD OR CHEMICAL SOBRIETY 
TEST. 
A suspect who has been detained on sus-
picion of driving while intoxicated is not 
entitled to Miranda advice before being 
asked to perform field or chemical sobrie-
ty tests according to the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland. McAvoy v. State, 314 Md. 
509,551 A.2d 875 (1989). In so doing, the 
court of appeals upheld the decisions of 
both the lower court and the Court of Spe-
cial Appeals of Maryland. 
Joseph McAvoy was stopped by police 
for failing to obey a sign which prohibited 
right turns on a red light. After McAvoy 
was stopped, the officer and McAvoy 
engaged in a discussion over whether such 
a sign existed. To resolve the dispute, both 
men returned to the intersection where the 
alleged infraction occurred. While there, 
they confirmed the existence of the sign in 
question, and at that point the officer then 
recognized signs of intoxication on 
McAvoy. As a result, the officer requested 
McAvoy to perform various field sobriety 
tests. McAvoy failed the tests and was 
arrested for driving while intoxicated. 
Shortly after the arrest, McAvoy was 
read a standard form DR-15, Advice of 
Rights to a Chemical Test. This form 
advised him of rights and obligations 
under Maryland's implied consent law 
(Maryland Transp. Code Ann. § 16-205.1), 
but did not advise him of his right to coun-
sel. McAvoy elected to take a breathalyzer 
test, which determined that he had .20 per-
cent by weight of alcohol in his blood. 
After the test, McAvoy was arrested for 
driving under the influence and advised of 
his Miranda rights. At trial McAvoy con-
tended that the evidence produced from 
these tests was obtained by custodial inter-
rogation and therefore not admissible 
without a prior Miranda warning. 
A custodial interrogation is defined in 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) as 
"questioning initiated by law enforcement 
officers after a person has been taken into 
custody or otherwise deprived of his free-
dom of action in any significant way." Id. 
at 444. To counter the "inherently com-
pelling pressures" of custodial interroga-
tion, the Supreme Court in Miranda held 
that a suspect in custody must be advised 
of certain constitutional rights and may 
only then voluntarily waive them if he so 
chooses. Id. at 467. 
McAvoy argued, and the court rejected, 
that at the time of the field sobriety test he 
was in custody. Even though the officer 
invited McAvoy to return to the scene of 
the infraction, and even though he had 
subjectively decided to detain McAvoy 
when he detected his intoxication, the 
court held that neither element was 
enough to elicit a custodial interrogation 
under Miranda. 
In further support of its position that 
McAvoy was not in custody, the court of 
appeals examined Berkemer v. McCarty, 
468 U.S. 420 (1984). The Supreme Court 
held that a temporary detention in connec-
tion with an ordinary traffic stop would 
not constitute custody in order to require 
Miranda advice. To remain temporary the 
stop must be brief, in a public place and 
the suspect must not be told that the stop 
would not be brief. Accordingly, a formal 
arrest would not result under Berkemer if 
"[a] single police officer asked a respon-
dent a modest number of questions and 
requested him to perform a simple balanc-
ing test at a location visible to passing 
motorists." McAvoy, 314 Md. at 516, 551 
A.2d at 878 (quoting Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 
434). Therefore, since McAvoy was stop-
ped in a public place, never told that his 
detention would not be brief, and the stop 
was in fact brief, he was not in custody 
according to Berkemer and the court of 
appeals. Furtheql1ore, during the stop, the 
officer only asked McAvoy to perform 
some field tests and did not interrogate 
him in any manner. McAvoy, 314 Md. at 
517, 551 A.2d at 879. 
After completion of the field sobriety 
test, however, McAvoy was formally 
arrested, taken into custody and asked to 
submit to a breathalyzer test. Nonetheless, 
the court held that McAvoy was still not 
entitled to Miranda advice because "[t]he 
breath taken from [him] was physical evi-
dence and was not testimonial within the 
meaning of the Fifth Amendment protec-
tion against self-incrimination." Id. at 518, 
551 A.2d at 879. This fifth amendment 
protection "bars the State only from com-
pelling 'communications' or 'testimony'. 
Since a blood [or breath] test was 'physical 
or real' evidence rather than testimoni-
al ... " it is not protected. South Dakota v. 
Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 559. McAvoy there-
fore had no right to Miranda advice prior 
to the breathalyzer test. 
The court of appeals further dismissed 
the argument that the officer's simple 
request of McAvoy to take a chemical 
sobriety test constituted an interrogation 
within the meaning of Miranda. Id. at 518, 
551 A.2d at 879. According to the identical 
holding in Neville, supra., the police 
inquiry "is highly regulated by state law, 
and is presented in virtually the same 
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words to all suspects." 459 U.S. at 564, n. 
15. Since the officer's inquiry was not 
designed to elicit testimonial evidence 
from McAvoy, again no Miranda advice 
was required. 
The right that McAvoy did possess, and 
which was not infringed, was the right not 
to be unreasonably refused counsel if 
requested. In addressing McAvoy's conten-
tions in this regard, the court of appeals 
relied on Sites v. State, 300 Md. 702, 481 
A.2d 192 (1984), which holds that "a per-
son under detention for drunk driving 
must, on request, be permitted a reasonable 
opportunity to communicate with counsel 
before submitting to a chemical sobriety 
test ... " Id. 300 Md. at 717-18,481 A.2d at 
192 (emphasis added). However, the right 
to counsel is limited only to circumstances 
that "will not substantially interfere with 
the timely and efficacious administration 
of the testing process." Id. Since McAvoy 
had neither requested counsel nor been 
formally charged with a crime, the court 
found that his Sixth Amendment rights 
were also not violated. 
By holding that a suspect is not entitled 
to Miranda advice prior to either a field or 
chemical sobriety test, the court of appeals 
has merely adopted the prevailing law set 
forth by the Supreme Court jn its 
decisions of Berkemer and Neville. The 
decision still insures that a suspect will not 
be deprived of counsel if requested. How-
ever, the court is further guaranteeing that 
persons who drive while intoxicated will 
nonetheless be accountable for such 
imprudent acts. 
- Timothy Mitchell 
Fairchild Space Co. v. Baroffio: "EARLY 
BIRD" EMPLOYEE NOT ELIGIBLE 
FOR WORKERS' COMPENSA nON 
UNDER TIlE COMING AND 
GOING RULE 
In Fatrchild Space Co. v. Baroffio, 77 Md. 
App.494, 551 A.2d 135 (1989), the Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland held that 
an "early bird" employee who was told by 
her supervisor to report to work early was 
not eligible for workers' compensation for 
injuries sustained on her way to work. As 
a result, the court limited the application 
of the "dual purpose" and "special errand 
or mission" exceptions under the "coming 
and going" rule. 
Susan Baroffio, the appellee, was an 
Associate Contract Administrator for 
Fairchild Space Company, the appellant. 
Her duties sometimes required her to 
work overtime without pay. On Friday, 
September 5, 1986, she was told by her 
supervisor to arrive at work one-half hour 
early on Monday to prepare a presenta-
tion. In preparation for the presentation, 
the appellee worked late on Friday, return-
ed to work on Saturday and worked at 
home on Sunday evening. On Monday, 
Ms. Baroffio left for work one-half hour 
earlier than normal by her usual route and 
was injured in a car accident. 
Ms. Baroffio filed a claim for compensa-
tion with the Maryland Workers' Com-
pensation Commission. The Commission 
made an "Award of Compensation" 
which Fairchild appealed to the Circuit 
Court for Montgomery County, which 
affirmed the Commission's award. Fair-
child then appealed to the Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland where both parties 
agreed to proceed on an expedited appeal 
and an agreed statement of facts. 
To begin its analysis, the court examined 
the language of the "coming and going" 
rule. The court noted that while the 
Workers' Compensation Act was designed 
to provide compensation for work-related 
injuries, injuries sustained while traveling 
to or from the work place are not covered. 
Id. at 497,551 A.2d at 136, (citing, Gilbert 
& Humphreys, Maryland Workers' Com· 
pensation Handbook, §6.6 (1988». There 
are, however, two applicable exceptions to 
this rule which allow an injured employee 
to receive compensation for injuries sus-
tained while coming and going to the 
work place. 
The court first applied the "dual pur-
pose" exception which states: 
Injury during a trip which serves both 
a business and a personal purpose is 
within the course of employment if 
the trip involves the performance of a 
service for the employer which would 
have caused the trip to be taken by 
someone even if it had not coincided 
with the personal injury., 
1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, 
§ 18.00 (1965). If an employee chooses to 
work at home for her convenience, com-
ing and going to work is not for a business 
purpose within the exception. Id., § 18.33 
at 4-316. Based upon this, the court found 
no evidence that Ms. Baroffio was required 
to work at home, rather, it was a matter of 
her personal preference, and concluded 
that her injuries did not fall within the 
dual purpose exception. 
In support of this conclusion, the court 
found Stoskin v. Board of Educ. of Mont· 
gomery County, 11 Md. App. 335, 274 A.2d 
397 (1971) to be directly on point.) In 
Stoskin, a school teacher who was told by 
the principal to study certain books prior 
to the first day of school, attempted to rely 
on the "dual purpose" exception after 
being injured on her way to work. Even 
though the teacher was in the course of her 
employment when reviewing the books, 
the court found no evidence that she was 
required to work at home. The Stoskin 
court found the "dual purpose" exception 
inapplicable because the teacher's review 
ended before she began her trip to work 
the following day. 
The court next proceeded to address the 
appellee's primary argument, that her 
injury was compensable under the "special 
errand or mission" exception. This excep-
tion provides: 
When an employee, having identifia-
ble time and space limits on his 
employment, makes an off-premises 
journey which would normally not be 
covered under the usual going and 
coming rule, the journey may be 
brought within the course of employ-
ment by the fact that the trouble and 
time of making the journey, or the spe-
cial inconvenience, hazard, or urgency 
of making it in the particular cir-
cumstances, is itself sufficiently sub-
stantial to be viewed as an integral part 
of the service itself. 
1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation lAw, § 
16.11 (1985). The court rejected this excep-
tion, and noted that the exception usually 
applies to employees who are regularly 
"on call" and are subsequently injured on 
their way to work. Fairchild, 77 Md. App. 
at 500, 551 A.2d at 139. The court of spe-
cial appeals reiterated its finding in Coats & 
Clark's Sales Corp. v. Stewart, 39 Md. App. 
10, 13, 383 A.2d 67, 70 (1978) that "the 
essential characteristic of a special errand 
or mission is that it would not have been 
undertaken except for the obligation of 
employment." 
The court also found Trent v. Collin S. 
Tuttle & Co., 20 A.D.2d 948, 249 N.Y.S. 2d 
140 (1964) persuasive in its rejection of the 
special errand exception. In Trent, an exec-
utive secretary who was required to turn 
in a report early the next day, worked late 
and completed the report at home. She left 
early the following morning and was 
injured on her way to work. The New 
York court rejected her argument that the 
"special errand" exception applied. That 
court held that travel to and from work is 
not a risk of employment unless the 
employee's home is really a second 
employment location where services are 
required to be rendered. Fairchild, 77 Md. 
App. at 502, 551 A.2d at 139. 
The Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland applied the New York court's 
rationale and found that Fairchild did not 
require Ms. Baroffio to work at home and 
that the "special errand or mission" excep-
tion to the "coming and going" rule did 
not apply. In so holding, the court has 
declined to expand workers' compensation 
laws to include an employee who is 
required to report to work early. 
- Michael P. Sawicki 
----------------------------------19.3 I The Law Forum-37 
